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Abstract 
 
The wave of protests in the Middle East, that started in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and brought 
about President Ben Ali’s removal from power took the world by storm. The aim of this thesis is to 
examine the role of the coercive apparatus in the outcome of the uprising, by examining the factors 
that affected its will and capacity to repress popular mobilisation. The four factors outlined as 
affecting this are fiscal health, international support networks, level of institutionalisation and level 
of popular mobilisation. The analysis shows that while the paramilitary units under the command of 
the Interior Ministry proved willing to engage in lethal repression of protesters, which only stoked 
further outrage, they did not possess the capacity in numbers to contain protests. The Interior 
Ministry as a whole was well staffed, but the bulk of its capacity was in intelligence and police 
rather than in dealing with large crowds.  The military, however, may have had the capacity to to 
repress protesters, but it chose to defect from the regime, refusing to order its troop to fire at 
protesters. The Tunisian military was highly institutionalised and both economically and politically 
disenfranchised from the regime, and so its officers were not invested in the survival of the regime. 
The international attention brought on Tunisia by the WikiLeaks US diplomatic cables detailing the 
corruption of the regime and the large demographic representation of protesters likely made the 
decision easier. So, in conclusion, the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus to repress had a 
significant affect on the outcome of the uprising. While the units under the interior ministry largely 
had the will to repress, they did not possess the capacity to do so in the face of the large crowds. 
The military however, apparently had the capacity to repress, but chose not to, which further 
galvanised protesters. Both of these findings had a significant impact on the outcome of the 
uprising, which resulted in Ben Ali’s removal from office.
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Abbreviations 
 
BMENA  Broader Middle East and North Africa 
 
BOP   Brigades d’Ordre Publique 
 
CPG  Compagnie de Phosphates de Gafsa 
 
EU   European Union  
 
IMF   The International Monetary Fund 
 
MEPI  Middle East Partner Initiative 
 
PSD  Parti Socialiste Déstourien 
 
RCD  Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique 
 
UGTT  Union Générale de Travailleurs Tunisiens 
 
US   The United States
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5 
1 Introduction 
 
The wave of protests in the Arab world in 2011, now commonly known as the ”Arab Spring”, has 
taken the world, along with Middle Eastern scholars, by storm. The revolution in Tunisia managed 
to, mostly peacefully, topple it’s 24-year standing dictator in only 27 days. 
Much of the discourse on the Arab Spring has centred on the underlying causes - socioeconomic, 
political, social - of the revolution. This assignment, however, will focus largely on the role of the 
coercive apparatus - ranging from security services to the military - played in the Tunisian uprising.  
On Habib Bourguiba Boulevard in Tunis, and the streets of Thala and Kasserine, police appeared 
unable to contain the flood of people, and shooting merely brought more people out in rage. When 
the army was called in to assist, it ultimately refused to shoot at protesters and, on 14 January, gave 
Ben Ali ”the velvet shove” out of the country. What caused the military commanders to refuse 
president Ben Ali’s orders to shoot at protesters, and why did the well-staffed and well-funded 
Interior Ministry fail to crush the uprising?  These are some questions that will be examined in this 
study. 
 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
 
Based on Eva Bellin’s theory that the stability of an authoritarian regime depends on the robustness 
of the coercive apparatus, this assignment will examine the different factors that may have 
influenced the will and capacity of Tunisia’s coercive apparatus to repress the unprecedented  
popular mobilisation seen during the Tunisian uprisings of 2011. The aim is to operationalise 
Bellin’s theory in the context of the Tunisian uprising. 
Thus, my research question is: 
 
In what way did the will and/or capacity of the Tunisian coercive apparatus to repress popular 
mobilisation affect the outcome of the 2011 uprisings?
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1.2 Theory 
 
The analytical framework is given by Eva Bellin in ”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective” and her 2012 article developing this 
theory, published after the 2011 Arab uprisings.1 Using a comparative approach, Bellin suggests 
that the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East is not due to the lack of democratic 
prerequisites, which is also found in other areas where democracy has nonetheless managed to 
prosper, but due to the will and capacity of the coercive apparatuses of authoritarian regimes to 
repress popular mobilisation and dissent.2 It is important to note, however, that it is not the whole 
concept of democratic prerequisites that is being jettisoned, merely that it is not sufficient in itself to 
explain the exceptional lack of democracy in the Middle East.3 Researcher Daniel Byman criticises 
Bellin for ignoring factors such as a weak civil society.4 However, her theory focuses on the success 
of a revolution in toppling an incumbent regime and system, not on the subsequent establishment of 
democracy.5 As Brownlee neatly puts it:  
 
I treat moments of potential authoritarian breakdown as the first contest in a 
multistage process of breakdown, transition and consolidation. The end of a 
dictatorship is a necessary but insufficient condition for the inauguration of 
representative democracy.6  
 
For a revolution to be successful, Bellin identifies four factors that influence the will and capacity 
of the coercive apparatus to suppress popular mobilisation. These are: the fiscal health of the 
coercive apparatus, international support networks, the level of institutionalisation of the coercive 
apparatus and the level of popular mobilisation.7 
 The fiscal health of the coercive apparatus may affect the ability to purchase necessary 
weapons and equipment, but prolonged fiscal crisis may also limit the ability to pay soldiers and 
police wages, which may decrease the will to repress in the name of the regime by, for example, 
causing men to desert. 
                                                
1 Eva Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative Perspective’, 
Comparativ Politics, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004, pp. 139-157. A version of this article also appeared in 2005 under 
the title ”Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders” in Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, 
Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, Colorado, 2005, pp. 21-
41  
Bellin, ’Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring’, 
Comparative Politics, vol. 44, no. 2, January 2012 pp. 127-149. 
2 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, pp. 142-4 
3 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 128 
4 Byman, Daniel ’Why Mideast Tumult Caught Scholars by Surprise’, Chronicle Of Higher Education, February 13, 
2011, <http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Mideast-Tumult-Caught/126307/>, accessed 20 May 2012 
5 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 143 
6 Jason Brownlee, ‘Political Crisis and Restabilisation: Iraq, Libya, Syria and Tunisia’ in Authoritarianism in the 
Middle East: Regimes and Resistance, p. 47 
7 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, pp. 144-7 
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 International support networks are international actors that actively or tacitly support the 
regime and the coercive apparatus. The loss of the support of these, or being actively sanctioned by 
the international community, may cripple the coercive apparatus financial capacity to sustain 
repression, but may also affect the willingness of the coercive apparatus to engage in repression in 
support of the regime. 
 The level of institutionalisation of the coercive apparatus is inversely related to the will of 
the coercive apparatus to repress popular mobilisation, meaning the less institutionalised it is, the 
more likely it is to stand by the regime.8 The level of institutionalisation is of particular interest 
since it is an internal factor, rather than an external one. Fiscal health, international support and 
level of popular mobilisation are all external factors relative to the coercive apparatus, whereas the 
level of institutionalisation of a coercive apparatus is integral in its very structure. This also makes 
it more resistant to rapid fluctuations, unlike most other components of a revolution - a highly 
institutionalised structure takes a long time to build, and likewise does not become de-
institutionalised overnight. 
 Finally, the level of popular mobilisation in several ways affects the will and capacity of the 
coercive apparatus to repress, since it greatly increases the cost of repression. Repressing large 
crowds risks international attention, and may in turn jeopardise the international support networks 
of the regime, as well as the domestic legitimacy of the regime.9 It also increases the risk of 
desertion, a prominent feature in the uprisings of both Libya and Syria.10 
 
Bellin’s approach does not focus on the causes of the uprising, but rather on the factors, once it was 
happening, that led the coercive apparatus to be unable and unwilling to repress protesters, which in 
turn caused the collapse of the authoritarian regime. Indeed, some claim that though we can try to 
identify the causes of an uprising, they are inherently unpredictable and will never be fully 
understood.11 Other researchers, such as Goldstone and Brownlee have proposed similar 
approaches, but identifying or categorising the factors differently. Goldstone’s theory focuses on 
elite fragmentation and alienation from the regime, especially the military, rather than the fiscal 
health and institutionalisation of the coercive apparatus. He argues that for the military to abandon 
its regime, the regime must appear so unjust or inept that it is viewed as a threat to the country’s 
future.12 Brownlee lends supports to Bellin’s argument about the importance of the repressive 
capacity of the coercive apparatus, but stresses the interplay between regime ”hard-liners” and 
                                                
8 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, pp. 144-5 
9 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 146 
10 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, pp. 130-1 
11 Katerina Dalacoura, ’The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications’ 
International Affairs, Vol. 88, 2012, p .69 
12 Jack A. Goldstone, ’Understanding the Revolutions of 2011’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, 2011, pp. 8-9 
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”soft-liners” and the role of external states using their influence to restrain, or refraining from 
restraining, repression  against opposition movements.13 However, both Goldstone’s and 
Brownlee’s approaches remain largely the same as Bellin’s, focusing on the process of regime 
destabilisation rather than the causes of the discontent, or existing prerequisites for democracy. 
 
In the original theory, Bellin refers to the coercive apparatus as a whole, but in her 2012 article she 
claims that in cases of such mass mobilisation as seen in 2011, when the police and intelligence 
apparatuses are overwhelmed, one only needs to look at the will and capacity of the military to 
asses the potential fall of the regime.14 However, this argument is arguably a simplification of her 
own theory, as one cannot dismiss such a large part of the coercive apparatus based on its 
incapacity to repress the large mass of people, when this is in fact what the theory claims to assess. 
While, the military indeed played decisive role in determining the outcome of the uprising, the 
actions of the police and internal security paramilitary forces still affected the process. Therefore, 
this study will include all parts of the coercive apparatus in analysing its will and capacity to repress 
popular mobilisation. 
 
 
 
 1.2.1 Definitions 
 
Coercive apparatus: By the coercive apparatus it is meant all parts of the military and internal 
security apparatus which are used by the regime to repress opposition and dissent.15 The use of the 
term coercive apparatus is sometimes problematic in literature, as it  is often used indiscriminately, 
when actually referring to certain parts of the coercive apparatus, such as the military or intelligence 
services.16 Similarly, the terms ”security apparatus” or ”security establishment” are often used in 
such a way that it leaves confusion as to whether it refers to a country’s intelligence service, 
military establishment or other coercive institutions. The coercive apparatus of the state must also 
be distinguished from its regime. Despite a tendency in authoritarian regimes to blur the lines 
between the coercive apparatus and the regime, they must be regarded as separate bodies.17 
                                                
13 Brownlee, pp. 57-60 
14 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 132 
15 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 130 
16 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 130 
17 Philippe Droz-Vincent, ’Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions’, The International 
Spectator, vol. 46, no. 2, 2011, p. 6  
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However, there may be different levels of connection to and hybridisation with the regime within 
different parts of the coercive apparatus, as will be evident from the following analysis. 18 
 
Level of institutionalisation: The definition of institutionalisation used here is the Weberian sense 
employed by Bellin, cited as following: 
 
An institutionalized coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed, predictable, and 
meritocratic. It has established paths of career advancement and recruitment; 
promotion is based on performance, not politics; there is a clear delineation between 
the public and private that forbids predatory behavior vis-à-vis society; and 
discipline is maintained through the inculcation of a service ethic and strict 
enforcement of a merit-based hierarchy.19 
 
The term ”professionalisation” has also been employed by researchers to suggest a similar and often 
overlapping significance. Researcher Mehran Kamrava’s definition covers that of Bellin’s while 
also including training and training facilities available, which goes outside the definition employed 
here.20 Kamrava’s definition, and others like it, would disrupt the balance of the analysis, since 
better training and equipment would increase the capacity to repress, while, following Bellin’s 
logic, it would also decrease the will to repress in order to defend the incumbent regime. Therefore, 
Bellin’s definition will be used in this study. 
 
Patrimonialism and un-institutionalised structures:  Bellin contrasts institutionalisation with a 
patrimonially organised structure,, and defines this as as structure within which: 
staffing decisions are ruled by cronyism; the distinction between public and 
Private mission is blurred, leading to widespread corruption and abuse of power; and 
discipline is maintained through the exploitation of primordial cleavage, often rely-
ing on balanced rivalry between different ethnic/sectarian groups. 
 
Bellin’s definition of patrimonialism, however, becomes constricting if it is to be the direct opposite 
of institutionalisation. Arguably, an organisational structure may lack institutionalisation without 
drawing on premordial ties. The term patrimonialism has also been the subject of some controversy,  
as its usage, and the use of the modern variant, neopatrimonialism, has varied greatly among 
scholars, with unclear defintions.21 Therefore, the term un-institutionalised will be employed as the 
opposite of an institutionalised structure, with its component characteristics directly opposing those 
                                                
18 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 143 
19 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 145 
20  Mehran Kamrava, ’Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East’, Political Science 
Quarterly, vol. 115, no. 1, 2000,  pp. 67-68.  
21 For a discussion on the use of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, see Gero Erdman and Ulf Engel, 
‘Neopatrimonialism Reconsidered, Critical Review and Elaboration of an Elusive Concept’, Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 95-119, February 2007 
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of Bellin’s definition of institutionalisation; It does not have established paths of recruitment and 
advancement, promotion is based on politics, rather than performance and there is no clear 
distinction between the public and private, allowing for predatory behaviour vis-à-vis society. As is 
evident, this definition largely overlaps that of Bellin’s definition of patrimonialism, but avoids the 
necessity of primordial ties as forming the basis of loyalties. 
 
Will and capacity: As Bellin points out, will and capacity should not be employed as a single 
variable. The coercive apparatus may have the capacity to repress protests, but decide not to 
because it doesn’t find it within its interest, or soldiers might defect when faced with firing at fellow 
countrymen. Likewise, a coercive apparatus might be willing to repress dissent, but find itself 
overpowered by popular mobilisation and civilian resistance. 
I argue that all four factors mentioned above must be assessed for their effect on both the will and 
capacity. In Bellin’s application of her previous theory on the Arab Spring, she categorises fiscal 
health and international support networks as affecting the capacity to repress, and level of 
institutionalisation and popular mobilisation as affecting the will of the coercive apparatus to 
repress.22 This, however, over-simplifies the argumentation in her 2004 article and would force one 
to disregard several important circumstances, such as the US diplomatic WikiLeaks cables 
(discussed below) and the relatively low funding of the military.23 For that reason, this analysis will 
use the original application of the theory, and asses all factors as affecting both will and capacity. 
 
 
1.3 Method and Material 
 
While Bellin uses comparative analysis, drawing on instances of attempted revolutions and great 
popular mobilisation from all over the Middle East and other parts of the World, there is still room 
for a deeper analysis in every specific context to properly dissect and analyse the course of events 
through Bellin’s analytical prism. As Barany points out when discussing prediction of the response 
of the military: ”There is no substitute for detailed, particular knowledge of a country and its armed 
forces.”24 This must be considered to be equally true for other parts of the coercive apparatus, 
which is why the Tunisian uprising will be examined in the following as a qualitative case study. 
While a more comparative approach might be useful for further testing of the theory, the aim of this 
paper is to operationalise Bellin’s theory in the Tunisian context.  
 
                                                
22 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 129 
23 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’, pp. 144-7 
24 Zoltan Barany, ‘The Role of the Military’, Journal of democracy, vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, p. 26. 
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The research is cumulative and largely based on secondary sources and scientific literature, along 
with media reports from events. A strong inhibitor to the use of primary sources is the difficulty in 
finding reliable information on the military and intelligence and security services of authoritarian 
countries.25 Thus, assessing to what extent a coercive apparatus, including its on-the-ground 
personnel as well as it’s top officials, was willing to engage in repression, largely becomes a matter 
interpreting actions and events that have come to public knowledge, while the internal motivations 
and thoughts remain unknown. The same is true for the capacity, which becomes a difficult task 
indeed when, for example, assessments on the amount of security officials employed by the 
Tunisian Interior Ministry differ by a number of 50,000 men.26 This does not mean, however, that 
useful deductions cannot be made from what is known to the outside world, simply that attention 
should be given to its limitations. 
 Another difficulty in analysing the Tunisian uprising is that it may be hard to understand the 
impact and significance of events, given that the occurred so recently. Much is also currently being 
produced on the subject, making the task of keeping abreast of the latest research of scholars and 
analysts difficult, and thus research shedding new light on events may be overlooked. It also means 
that much of the material used in the following has had little time to be scrutinised by other 
scholars, which might have otherwise brought to light argumentative flaws or theoretical criticism, 
adding depth to the analysis. 
 
When recapitulating the events of the uprisings, some articles from news agencies, particularly al-
Jazeera are referred to. Al-Jazeera was one of the networks with the most extensive coverage of the 
Arab uprisings, including Tunisia, which is why it is indeed a useful resource to find detailed 
reports on events. Some caution must be made, as the network has been criticised for overtly 
supporting the protests in Tunisia and Egypt. It has been accused of exaggerating the number of 
protesters on the ground, while largely ignoring to report on protests in other countries, such as 
Bahrain.27 
 
I will assess each of the four factors Bellin outlines as influencing the capacity and will of the 
coercive apparatus to repress popular mobilisation during the Arab spring.  Focus will be on the 
contemporary context during the time of the uprising, while taking the historical background into 
consideration. Depending on their primacy in this particular context, some factors will be examined 
                                                
25 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed, Routledge, Oxon, 2004, p. 
179.  Barany, p. 26 
26 Brieg Tomos Powel, ’The stability syndrome: US and EU democracy promotion in Tunisia’, Journal of North 
African Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 2009 pp. 70. 
27 Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions of the Middle East, Public Affairs, 2012, Kindle 
eBook, p. 20. Droz-Vincent, ’Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions’, p. 12 
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more thoroughly than others, such as the level of institutionalisation of the  coercive apparatus and 
international support networks. 
 
1.3.1 Previous Research 
  
Eva Bellin provides the theoretical framework from which I start of my analysis, in her 2004 paper 
”The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in a Comparative 
Perspective”.28 A follow-up assessment and analysis of this paper was published by Bellin in 2012, 
in which she discusses her earlier work in light of the event of the Arab Spring.29 Bellin’s approach 
has been criticised for ignoring the importance of civil society in democratisation.30 However, one 
can argue that her theory focuses on the success of popular mobilisation in bringing about regime 
change, not on the subsequent establishment of democracy.31 There are also some discrepancies in 
the application of her own theory between the articles published in 2004 and 2012. The 2012 article 
assigns certain factors to affect the will and others the capacity, a distinction that was not made 
clear in the 2004 article. While I have chosen to apply the original theory, it does put into question 
the basis for Bellin’s reasoning in amending the theory, as this is not clearly outlined, but presented 
in a way that gives the impression that this was the original reasoning. 
 
There is much currently being written on the Arab Uprisings, new material being published every 
month, thus making it difficult to keep abreast with the latest research. One of the works which 
have been used extensively in this assignment is renowned French scholar Jean-Pierre Filiu’s work, 
”The Arab Revolution, Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising”. It gives a multifaceted 
analysis of the uprisings and what their impact has and will be, dividing it into ten main lessons to 
draw from the events. An issue with Filiu’s work is its popular-scientific nature, as it seems to be 
aimed at the general public as much as other scholars. Consequently, Filiu allows himself to draw 
on his personal experience and scholarly knowledge in his analysis, rather than always backing up 
his statements with investigable sources. Time and further research will have to determine how 
accurate Filiu’s analysis of the implications of these uprisings will turn out to be, a flaw that is 
inherent in any work on the Arab uprisings, due to the closeness of events. 
 
Emma Murphy’s work ”Economic and Political change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali” is 
employed in this assignment largely for historical reference, as it provides a thorough presentation 
                                                
28 Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism’ 
29 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’ 
30 Byman, ’Why Mideast Tumult Caught Scholars by Surprise’ 
31 31 Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism’, p. 143 
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of the developments of the Tunisian political elite. Though it has been criticised for being too 
optimistic about Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s achievements regarding economic liberalisation, it does 
provide a solid historical overview of the political development in addition to the economic one, 
which is the focus of this assignment.32 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
Historically, the main focus of this essay will be the events of the Tunisian uprising, stretching from 
17 December 2010 to 14 January 2011. The historical background, however, will extend as far back 
as the Tunisian independence, and some mentions will be made of events after 14 January 2011. 
 
1.5 Disposition 
 
The disposition of the paper will here be presented. The introduction will be followed by a 
background chapter outlining the relevant historical background of Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s 
presidencies and their relationship with the coercive apparatus. The chapter outlines three major 
incidences of social upheaval the preceded the 2011 uprising. The analysis section starts with a 
discussion on assessing the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus and is followed by an 
account of the events of the Tunisian uprising. Thereafter, each of the four factors outlined by 
Bellin are analysed in a section each. The analysis is followed by a conclusion of the findings of 
this assignment. The last section is a bibliography of the literature and sources used in this paper.
                                                
32Larbi Sadiki, ’Bin Ali's Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
vol. 29, no. 1, 2002, p. 69 
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2 Background 
 
Before the Tunisian Uprising, Tunisia had only known two presidents since independence, Habib 
Bourguiba and Zine El-Abedine Ben Ali. This section will give a brief historical overview of the 
two presidencies, giving particular attention on their relations with the state’s coercive apparatus. 
Furthermore, three incidents of popular mobilisation that were repressed by the country’s coercive 
apparatus will be outlined, as points of reference to the 2011 Uprising. 
 
2.1 Bourguiba and the Coercive Apparatus 
 
In contrast to many other countries in the Middle East, Tunisia won its independence through 
negotiations rather than armed struggle. Popular mobilisation was achieved through the unions, in 
particular the Union Générale de Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) and the Neo-Destour party, lead 
by Habib Bourguiba, who also became the country’s first president after successfully negotiating 
for independence with the French colonial power.  Though battles against the French were fought, 
notably in Bizerte in 1961, this was not the main factor in the power transfer. This, many believe, 
has had a strong effect on Tunisia’s political development, which has, in a regional context, tended 
towards moderation rather than aggression.33 Since a military coup was thwarted in 1962, Habib 
Bourguiba distrusted the military and routinely favoured the Interior Ministry over it, a trend which 
was later continued and was even more notable in the regime of Zine Abdine Ben Ali.34 Even 
though the military has, to a large extent, been kept out of domestic affairs, it was on several 
occasions deployed to repress dissent and popular mobilisation.35 
 
In 1978, the UGTT strived to achieve greater independence from the ruling party, Parti Socialiste 
Déstourien (PSD), as resentment grew within its ranks over rising unemployment. The UGTT 
called for a general strike on 26 January. Bourguiba responded by declaring a state of emergency 
and calling in the military to suppress riots in Tunis, leaving 51 dead and hundreds of people 
injured.36 
 
The next episode of people taking to the streets in big numbers occurred  in 1984. Following several 
years of economical hardships, reforms aiming at raising revenues through taxation of the middle 
                                                
33 Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali, Macmillian Press Ltd, Great 
Britain, 1999, pp. 48-59 
34 Jean-François Daguzan, "Les armées en politique: des trajectoires divergentes", Confluences Méditerranée, , no. 29, 
1999, p. 33 
35 Murphy, p. 66 
36 Murphy, p. 60 
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and upper classes were blocked by vested interests from within the PSD. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank pushed for cutting food subsidies, leading the 
government to strongly reduce wheat and cereal subsidies, causing bread prices to double overnight. 
The working class responded furiously, with nationwide riots raging for over a week.37 A key 
difference to the riots in 1978 is that these were spontaneous protests in response to what was seen 
as the government using the working class to finance its policies for the benefit of the richer 
segments of society.38 As in 1978, the army and police were brought in to quell protests, indicating 
an ever increasing reliance of Bourguiba’s regime on its coercive apparatus.39 In the end, Bourguiba 
blamed his prime minister, Muhammad Mzali for the policies, who in turn blamed the Interior 
Minister for the harsh response of the coercive apparatus, dismissing him and taking on the 
portfolio himself. The president had to give in to the demands of the protesters and cancelled the 
subsidy cuts, demanding the government replace the loss of revenue with increased taxes on luxury 
goods, international travel and alcohol, which would mostly affect the middle and upper classes. He 
thus distanced himself from the decision to cut subsidies and managed to reap popular approval 
from the crisis.40 
 
2.2 Ben Ali’s Rise to Power 
 
On november 7, 1987, Habib Bourguiba woke up to finding himself deposed as President of 
Tunisia. The previous night his Prime Minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, had ordered the 
Presidents palace surrounded by troops under his control, arrested key supporters of the president 
and brought in a team of doctors to sign papers declaring Bourguiba medically incapable of 
performing his duties as president. He thus deposed him in accordance with the Tunisian 
constitution.41 With age, Bourguiba’s mental health had become more and more unreliable, with a 
struggling economy and increasing repression causing frustration among the people. Therefore, Ben 
Ali acted with support of several ministers, who had grown tired of their increasingly erratic boss.42 
The issue of succession for their ageing  president had long been a matter of concern for Tunisia’s 
political establishment, with Bourguiba tending to dismiss his prime ministers and other people of 
high influence on a regular basis to avoid anyone building up a strong enough power base to 
challenge him. Once presented with the fait accompli, many Tunisians, as well as the international 
community, welcomed the coup, as it preempted political instability while seeming to provide hope 
                                                
37 Lynch, The Arab Uprising,  p.45 
38 Murphy, p. 65 
39 Brownlee, p. 51 
40 Murphy, p. 66 
41 Brownlee, p. 52 
42 Murphy, p. 77 
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of an opening of the political sphere43. Having been appointed Prime Minister earlier in October 
that year, Ben Ali acted swiftly, so as not to risk being dismissed before he could stage his coup. 
Ben Ali’s background was in both the military and security services. He was an army General, and 
served as General Director of Security, thereby being in charge of the police forces during the 1978 
riots, and was thus often blamed for the shooting of protesters during these events.44 After 
independence, he was part of developing Tunisia’s security services, and served for a lengthy 
period as Director of Military Security. In 1984 he was appointed Secretary of State for National 
Security and later Minister for the Interior in 1986.45 In October 1987, after another cabinet 
reshuffle by the increasingly paranoid Bourguiba, he replaced Rachid Sfar as Prime Minister, and 
became Secretary-General of the PSD, while still keeping the Interior Ministry portfolio. He then 
found himself in a position of control over both the security forces and the party, while retaining a 
strong influence over the army, which he put to good use on November 6 1987.46 
 
2.3 The Regime of Ben Ali - Continued Coercion 
 
Prior to Ben Ali’s coup, fears had been raised that he would lead a military takeover of the state. 
The political climate became increasingly tenuous in the last years of Bourguiba’s rule, which were 
the most repressive of his presidency, along with a looming economic crisis. However, even though 
Ben Ali did take over the reigns of power, his coup was rather political than military, that took great 
care to be perceived as constitutionally legitimate.47 He did still, however, represent an intervention 
of the military in civilian governance, which was precisely what Bourguiba had been so wary of 
during his rule. Ben Ali soon proved to reason in the same way - disallowing the office corps of the 
army any political involvement - even membership in the ruling party.48 
 
Ben Ali initially appeared willing to open up the political system and liberalise the economy,   
releasing thousands of political prisoners, including some prominent members of the opposition. He 
also restructured the PSD, renaming it the Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD), to 
underline the democratic transition, and developed a ”National Pact” together with the main 
opposition and social organisations. Despite these initial openings however, little real progress was 
made. The electoral system ensured the RCD won all seats in the National Assembly in the 1989, 
despite independent candidates from the Islamist party Al-Nahda, that was still refused legal 
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recognition as a party, receiving 17% of the vote as independents. Ben Ali also won 99% of the 
vote in the presidential election.49 Repression of Islamists and other oppositional groups increased 
soon after the election. Ben Ali used the threats of the Islamist and examples from Algeria and Iran 
to explain the increased focus on security.50 The internal security apparatus was greatly expanded 
over the years, both within and outside of the Interior Ministry.51 In 1993, the security budget 
occupied 10% of all public spending.52 By 2011, though the Tunisian military retained a relatively 
small but professional force of around 27,000 men, the Interior Ministry employed, according to 
one estimate, 120 000 people, which translates into one security agent for every 85 Tunisians.53 
 
One major event of popular mobilisation which preceded the uprising in 2011 is what has been 
termed the 2008 ”miner revolt” in the province of Gafsa, predominantly in the town of Rdeyef. 
Researcher James Gelvin even called this ”the first arab uprising”.54 The region, highly reliant on its 
phosphate mining industry, had seen rising unemployment since the 1980’s, as modernisation had 
allowed the companies to lay off workers. Frustration over unemployment, salaries and the 
corruption of the previously state-owned, but now privatised, mining company Compagnie de 
Phosphates de Gafsa (CPG) came to a tipping point on 6 January 2008. The results of a recruitment 
process of 380 new workers was revealed, in which friends and families of people in high positions 
in the UGTT had been selected over other more qualified unemployed people.55 Protest, strikes by 
local unions and flares of unrest increased in intensity over the following months, until, when some 
masked youngsters attacked a police office, the security forces saw an excuse to intervene. 
Residential areas were attacked with tear gas and activists were arrested. However, as the protests 
continued over the next few weeks, police repeatedly being too outnumbered to break up crowds 
with tear gas and batons, harder measures were called for. On 6 June, police used live bullets 
against protesters, killing one and injuring 21. The following day, the army was deployed and took 
control over most of the city of Redeyef. In the ensuing weeks, scores of activists were arrested, 
with syndicate leaders and opposition activists being targeted. Many were given punishments of 10 
years of imprisonment Bereft of its leadership, the movement dies out, and fails to spread to other 
parts of the country. 56 
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3 Analysis 
 
In this section, the four factors identified by Bellin as affecting the will and capacity will be 
discussed and analysed. The events during the uprising in late December 2010 and January 2011 
will be briefly recapitulated to provide empirical material for the analysis. The four factors will then 
be discussed and analysed one by one, thereby operationalising Bellin’s theory on the Tunisian 
uprising. 
 
3.1 Assessing Will and Capacity of the Coercive Apparatus. 
 
Bellin notes that it is the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus to repress popular mobilisation 
that determines the success of a revolution, and that these in turn are decided by four factors: fiscal 
health, International support networks, level of institutionalisation and level of popular 
mobilisation. 
 Fiscal health refers to the economic capacity of the state to finance its coercive apparatus. If 
the state is not able to pay security forces salaries, or pay for ammunition and other materiel, this 
seriously compromises the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus to face popular dissent.57 
 The maintenance of international support networks is often linked to fiscal health, as 
international patrons often provide substantial economic support, withdrawal of which can lead to 
an acute financial crisis. Similarly, the imposition of heavy sanctions from the international 
community can also provoke a financial crisis. However, as Bellin notes, International criticism and 
scrutiny may also lead to an existential crisis for the coercive apparatus, especially if this is highly 
institutionalised, leading it to question the durability and legitimacy of the current regime.58 
Brownlee notes the impact of international patrons in using their influence to limit violent 
repression during crises, as refraining from putting pressure on coercive regimes may give the 
regime free reins to engage in bloody repression.59 
 The third factor, level of institutionalisation, is inversely related to the will of the coercive 
apparatus to resist political change. An institutionalised structure, here used in the Weberian sense, 
has established paths of recruitment, follows bureaucratic procedures and is meritocratic. This is 
contrasted with an un-institutionalised structure, where staffing decisions are political rather than 
meritocratic, and in which there is no clear distinction between the public and the private, and 
rampant corruption is commonplace.60 This is often the case in authoritarian and personalistic 
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regimes to ensure loyalty, both in society and the coercive apparatus.61 However,  having an  un-
institutionalised structure can contribute to the resilience of an authoritarian regime, as the elite of 
the coercive apparatus will then perceive to be threatened by political change. If it is 
institutionalised however, it is more likely to see itself as separate from the state, and its positions 
might not be threatened by political change. An institutionalised  coercive establishment is also 
more likely to perceive itself as having a national mission for the public good, such as national 
defence, rather than serving individual advancement.62 Droz-Vincent notes that while authoritarian 
regimes often build institutions, they often empty them of their value by entrenching themselves 
and their informal networks in the institutional grids.63 
 Finally, the fourth factor affecting the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus is the level 
of popular mobilisation. Low levels of popular mobilisation means the cost of repression remains 
low, as smaller crowds are easier to forcibly disperse and will not involve as many casualties as 
when dealing with larger crowds. Commanding soldiers or police to shoot at a large mass of 
unarmed civilians risks causing a bloodbath.64 A large mass of people also makes it difficult for 
regimes to dismiss it as a group of extremists or terrorists threatening security, making police and 
troops more likely to defect, especially if the crowd is relatively representative of the demographics 
of the troops or police themselves.65 It is also more likely to attract international attention, as was 
well seen in Egypt, where the protests on Tahrir square had around-the-clock coverage from Al-
Jazeera and other news networks.66 In short, higher levels of popular mobilisation increases the cost 
of repression, and so might cause regime leaders and elites within the coercive apparatus to hesitate 
with the use of force.67 
   
Assessing the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus also requires a clear definition of what is 
meant by the coercive apparatus. In an authoritarian regime, this is often extensive and divided into 
multiple institutions and units of different functions and loyalties, often overlapping each other. In 
Tunisia, there was a clear difference between the military and the Interior Ministry, in charge of the 
police and intelligence services, as well as the National Guard - a paramilitary force of some 12,000 
designed to counteract the military and employed for domestic security, rather than for protection 
against outside threats. Naturally, many details of the security services of the Interior Ministry are 
unknown and the line of commands are often unclear, but these may be considered the more 
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important institutions playing a role in the Tunisian revolution. The military has always been keep 
relatively small and at arms length from the state, and consisted of 27,000 men, whereas the Interior 
Ministry employed as many as 120,000 people68. The institutional character of the different parts of 
the coercive apparatus and how they interacted with each other during the events of 2010 and 2011 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
 
3.2 The Revolution 
 
On 17 December 2010, fruit vendor Mohammed Bouazizi’s protest of self-immolation in front of 
the local municipal office in Sidi Bouzid in response to being harassed by local police one time too 
many. His desperate demonstration sparked a wave of protest thitherto unseen in Tunisia. On the 
eve of Bouazizi’s attempted suicide, some 50 of his friends and family, accompanied by other cart-
vendors, demonstrate peacefully outside the Mayor’s office.69 The protest was recorded and posted 
on youtube, and subsequently  got picked up by the web-team at Al-Jazeera, which aired it on it’s 
Mubashir channel the same evening.70 The following day, Saturday, a bigger crowd gathered, and 
mid-afternoon, the police dispersed the protesters with tear gas and violence, following protesters 
into the residential areas. This was repeated over the next few days, as the protests continued to 
grow. 
 On 20 December, residents of the town of Meknassi held a demonstration in support of 
protesters in Sidi Bouzid, and protests started in other cities around the region. On 22 December 
another young Sidi Bouzid-resident set himself on fire in protest and on 24 December, the first 
victims of the coercive apparatus was claimed, as police shot several protesters to death in the town 
of Menzel Bouzaiene in a protest of over 2000 people. 71 The Interior Ministry defended itself, a 
spokesperson saying that the police were forced to shoot in self-defence since protesters hadn’t 
dispersed after warning shots. In the following days, protests started flaring up in several cities. In 
some cases, protest are blocked or broken up peacefully, whereas in others, people were forcibly 
dispersed by the police. 
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 On 27 December, the first major demonstration was held in Tunis, with around 1000 people 
gathering after a night of security crackdowns on protest rallies.72 In the following day, President 
Ben Ali made his first public appearance since the start of the protests, stating they were 
unacceptable and blaming extremists for the use of violence.73 The protests continued to escalate 
after that, with bigger masses assembling in an increasing number of locations, intensifying 
pressure on security forces.  
 On 5 January, Mohammed Bouazizi was buried, and 5000 rallied at his funeral procession. 
It is the weekend of 8-10 January, however, that has been claimed to be ”the tipping point of the 
revolution”. In the central cities of Kasserine and Thala, the police anti-riot units, the Brigades 
d’Ordre Publique (BOP) and the presidential guard joined the local police. The presidential guard 
posted snipers all around the cities. Dozens of people were killed, but protests continued unabated, 
with more indignity than before. The army had been deployed in Kasserine on 8 January, first 
strictly protecting banks and government buildings.74 However, on 9 January the Army Chief of 
Staff, Rachid Ammar, refused the order to fire at protesters, and his units followed through on his 
orders, even after he was dismissed. This has been called the fatal blow for the regime, as it broke 
the barrier of fear for Tunisians, and in the following days, the uprising truly became nationwide.75 
In a televised speech on 13 January, the President promised not to run for reelection in 2014, but the 
protesters were not satisfied with anything less than his departure. 76 
 
On the following day, 14 January, Ali Seriati, Chief of Presidential Security and Ben Ali’s foremost 
security officer, commander of the presidential guard and effectively in charge of the police and the 
Interior Ministry, intentionally exaggerated his security reports to Ben Ali, in order to get full 
support for indiscriminate repression of protesters.77 This led Ben Ali to panic. A state of 
emergency was declared, and the president left the country for Saudi Arabia, confident that Ali 
Seriati will be able to restore order and bring him back.78 Ammar and the Army quickly moved 
against Ali Seriati, surrounding the palace and other crucial buildings of the national guard, and 
arresting hardliners of the regime. Seriati still tried to provoke chaos, deploying street gangs that 
killed indiscriminately, leaving 31 people dead on 14 January and many more in the days following 
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Ben Ali’s departure.79 However, he was arrested a few days after Ben Ali’s departure while on his 
way to Libya. The military did not intend to stay in power, and a civilian national unity government 
was quickly formed, though not without its controversies and episodes of violent flares. Tunisia 
successfully held it’s first democratic elections in November 2011, voting in a new constituent 
assembly, with the task to draft a new constitution.80 
 
3.3 Fiscal Health 
 
Though Tunisia was struggling with high youth unemployment and the global economic  recession, 
which many researchers agree was part of the background causes of the uprising, it did not, in fact, 
face a financial crisis in which it would risk being unable to finance its coercive apparatus.81 Unlike 
the case in subsequent uprisings in Middle Eastern countries, Western states barely had time to 
understand what was happening before the president was deposed, and so had no time to impose 
economic sanctions against the regime.82 However, it is interesting to look at the fiscal health of 
different institutions within the coercive apparatus, as this may have affected the will of elites 
within the different institutions. The coercive apparatus governed by the Interior Ministry remained 
much better funded than the military - especially special paramilitary units such as the presidential 
guard and the anti-riot BOP units. Employees, conscripts and elites within the coercive apparatus 
that are better paid and better treated by the regime are more likely to go further to protect its 
regime.83 The Tunisian military was kept very modestly funded, and its officers reportedly disliked 
widespread corruption of the civilian political elite.84 Thus, the military had very few economic 
interests to protect, whereas the security establishment of the Interior Ministry had much more to 
loose from a regime change. The security and intelligence services of the Interior Ministry, 
however, were far more politically important and involved in the Ben Ali regime. 85 
 This is not necessarily true for the entire width of organisations and units covered by the 
Interior Ministry however. Regular local police forces might have been corrupt and abusive - but 
they also had very low salaries. After the fall of the regime, on 24 January, a demonstration of some 
2,000 police officers took place in Tunis. They wanted to distance themselves from the regime and 
the repression, many being joined by their families, shouting ”we are innocent of the blood of 
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martyrs”. They also demanded the right to form a union and higher wages.86 Even though many of 
the people participating in this demonstration may well have been a part of repressing protesters, it 
does suggest that a discontentment with their situation was present already before the uprising. 
While one should be careful about drawing conclusions from this demonstration regarding to the 
motivations and motives of police officers before and during the uprising, an existing 
discontentment with their situation can be assumed not to have further motivate police to violently 
repress protesters and it does seem that it was special units within the the police and presidential 
guard that was responsible for the worst repression and killing of protesters.87 
 
3.4 International Support Networks 
 
Tunisia has long been hailed as an example of good economic development and political stability 
by Western nations and institutions such as the IMF. Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s secular policies 
have been welcomed as a protection against Islamism and terrorism and little pressure has been put 
on the government for real democratic change.88 Yet, to understand the influence international 
support networks may have had on the coercive apparatus’ will and capacity to repress the popular 
uprising, in particular the military’s, we must look at the historic development of international 
support to Tunisia, especially from the two main international bodies involved in the region, the 
European Union (EU), Tunisia’s main trading partner, and the United States (US). 
 
3.4.1 Security and Democracy Policies of the US and EU 
 
Both the EU and the US connect security with democratisation. This notion has been particularly 
evident among policy makers in the US, especially post September 11. Democratisation has been 
put forward as a way of ”draining the swamp”, that is, diminishing the pool of discontent allegedly 
connected with political misrepresentation from which terrorist organisations get their recruits.89 
The prime example of this is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, fighting terrorism and establishing 
democracy was enough justification for the US to attack without the backing of the United 
Nations90 The attacks of September 11 also led to a broadening of the definition of security threats, 
in which threats could also include non-state actors, such as terrorism. This meant that even though 
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friendly undemocratic states might not be considered a threat, parts of their population might, which 
elevates the need to make the population feel less disenfranchised from its state, through increased 
welfare and political representation.91 
 The causal link between democracy and security is found amongst EU policy-makers as 
well. However, the EU definition of security extends to that of human security, meaning the 
safeguarding of each individual, as opposed to merely the state, which makes political rights and 
good governance of the citizens of other states central to its own security concerns, thus 
encompassing democratisation. A former French foreign minister declared, B. T. Powel points out: 
”When violence returns to the Middle East, sooner or later it shows up in Paris”.92  
 
3.4.2 Conflicting Security Concerns  
 
The US and EU democracy promotion in the region is funnelled mainly through their respective 
Middle East or Mediterranean cooperation programs, such as the Middle East Partner Initiative 
(MEPI) for the US, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for the EU and the Broader Middle 
East and North Africa (BMENA) Partnership Initative, which is run by the G8 group of nations on 
the initiative of the US. Though all of these program have an objective of increased political 
liberalisation and popular representation, they also include economic and security cooperations. 
Despite their often high-flying rhetorics, both the US and EU have far from universally applied the 
policies of pursuing democracy for the sake of long-term security, as can be seen in the case of 
Tunisia.93  
 Both blocs have been reluctant to apply much political pressure at all on Tunisia for reform, 
even in the face of blatant abuses of human rights or refusal to keep up the pace of reforms within 
democratisation and liberalisation programs.94 In 1995, Tunisia signed the Barcelona Agreement, a 
free-trade agreement with the EU that also encompasses political reforms in Tunisia and a 
conditionality clause in which it would accept any consequences if these requirements were not 
met. However, there were no specified procedures on how to investigate this progress, nor has this 
conditionality clause ever been invoked. Several theories for this apparent hypocrisy have been 
suggested by researchers, but most agree that it is the West’s fear of Islamism which is central to 
the issue.95 
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 Western nations have always been wary of Islamism in the region, a tendency that has been 
further amplified by events such as the Algerian civil war, bombings in Tunisia in the 1990s and the 
September 11 and Madrid bombing attacks. These fears have not been comforted by the fact that 
Tunisian Islamists have traditionally been very moderate. The main Islamic party, Al-nahda, early 
on accepted to play the rules of the game and denounced the use violence.96 Ben Ali was 
successfully able to stoke the West’s fear of Islamist terrorists in order to secure Western support. 
Indeed, during 2002-2007, the US was spending far more on security and anti-terrorism related 
support in Tunisia than on democracy promotion programs, which were all region-wide and very 
few specific to Tunisia.97 Researcher Alejandro Sanchez suggests that Western Nations have even 
contributed to upholding the authoritarian regime through its investment in the Tunisian economy, 
in particular in the energy sector.98 
 It is evident that though democracy might be seen as a way of achieving long-term security 
objectives in the Middle East for Western nations, it has not been the only method. As long as the 
Ben Ali regime has successfully repressed Islamic movements and opposition, and cooperated with 
US and EU anti-terrorism schemes, policy-makers appear to have been quite content to allow Ben 
Ali to stay comfortably in power.99 For the US, Ben Ali’s amity towards Israel also provided a very 
good reason not to push for more reforms than the regime was willing to pass of its own accord.100 
 
3.4.3 Unconditional Support? 
 
Western silent backing of Ben Ali’s regime continued until the events of 2010 and 2011. Indeed, on 
11 January 2011, French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie proposed France offers Tunisia the 
”knowledge of its security forces”.101 The proposal was stopped over public outrage, however, and 
Alliot-Marie was eventually forced to resign in the face of public criticism.102 This not to say that 
the Tunisian government has been immune from international criticism. Human rights groups such 
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as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have both released reports directing strong 
criticism against the Tunisian regime and its human rights abuses.103 
 There have also been incidents were the Tunisian regime has been under fire from 
International media, and to some extent the international community. In 2000, Tunisian journalist 
and correspondent for French newspaper La croix, Tawfiq Bin Brik, staged a hunger strike after he 
and his family members had been severely harassed by the Tunisian security services after he 
published a series of regime-critical articles. Bin Brik’s passport was confiscated and his brother 
was arrested after clashing with security police, who were surveilling their home. The affair drew a 
lot of unwanted international attention, as sympathetic journalists in France and around the world 
ensured wide media coverage.104 The pressure force the Ben Ali regime to make concessions to Bin 
Brik and his family and, though it may not have left any serious mark on the regime, it did serve to 
expose the regime and showed that it does not confine itself to repressing only Islamist dissidents, 
putting into question Franco-Tunisian security cooperation.105  
 
One incident that has been noted to have had a big impact on the Tunisian uprising is the 
WikiLeaks release of US diplomatic cables, in which the American ambassador in Tunisia 
described Ben Ali as ageing and his rule as ”sclerotic”. It also stated, in clear print, that Tunisia was 
a police state, that its government had lost touch with its people and the extent of the corruption of 
the Presidential family, notably that of Ben Ali’s wife, the Trabelsi family.106 The cables not only 
confirmed previously mentioned US security interests in Tunisia, combatting terrorism and support 
for Israel, it also demonstrated to the Tunisian people that even US officials were saying the same 
things they were saying.107 Further more, the notion that the US would back the incumbent regime 
regardless of what happened was disputed.108 The WikiLeaks cables may have influenced the 
actions of the outcome of the uprising in two ways: firstly, the release of the cables may have 
stoked people’s will to take to the streets, thus increasing the level of popular mobilisation, the 
impact of which will be further discussed below. Secondly, one may discuss the influence the 
cables may have had on military leaders decision not to back the regime and give Ben Ali the 
”velvet shove” out of the country. Though this not possible to support by any documentation of the 
reasoning of military leaders, one may well draw some logic conclusions. The military was known 
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to dislike the widespread corruption of top regime officials, so the publication of the cables was 
likely perceived as just as shameful as for other Tunisians, further questioning the legitimacy of the 
regime.109 The public knowledge that these views were present within the US administration also 
dramatically reduced the risk of their interference on the side of the regime, which would have 
caused international uproar. Zoltan Barany outlines both the legitimacy of the regime and the risk of 
foreign interventions as key factors in deciding whether or not top security officials would prop up 
the regime or defend the demonstrators in a revolution.110 French newspaper Le Monde also 
reported that Obama Administration notified Ben Ali on 13 January, the day before his departure, 
that the time had come to leave the country, which may have influenced the turn of events. 
However, this report remains unverified by the former and current Tunisian administrations as well 
as by the US administration. 
 
3.4.4 The Impact of Media Coverage 
 
There was an unusually comprehensive media coverage of the protests, which increased pressure 
both in the Tunisian regime and on international players, who would risk appearing hypocritical if 
speaking out in support of a dictator when people demonstrated for democracy, as was seen in the 
case of the French Foreign Minister mentioned earlier.111 The protest of Bouazizi’s friend’s and 
familiy the day after his attempted suicide was aired on Al-Jazeera already at an early stage in the 
uprising, and the network heavily covered the protests. Researcher Marc Lynch suggests that the 
network may even have covered it more heavily than it would have otherwise, due previous clashes 
with the Tunisian authorities, the networks office in Tunis having been repeatedly closed down. 
Tensions had even led Tunisia to close down its embassy in Doha in protest of Al-Jazeera’s 
reporting. 112 
 
3.5 Level of Institutionalisation 
 
The level of Institutionalisation is of particular interest when assessing the will and capacity of the 
coercive apparatus to repress, since it is an internal factor, integral in the structure of the institutions 
of the coercive apparatus. This increases the importance of examining the different institutions 
existing within the coercive apparatus. In Tunisia’s case, the main divide was between the military 
and the Interior Ministry. Under the command of the Interior Ministry there was, as mentioned 
previously, the National Guard, a para-military force that mostly dealt with domestic disturbances, 
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the Presidential Guard, under the command of Ali Seriati, the police and of course an extensive 
secret service and intelligence apparatus, of which, however, it remains very difficult for 
researchers to find reliable information on. This also true, though perhaps not to the same extent, of 
the other parts of the Interior Ministry and even the armed forces.113  
 If employing the Weberian definition of institutionalisation, this factor is perhaps the one the 
most clearly affects only one of the variables in employing coercion on protestors - the will to 
repress. However, if one considers Kamrava’s definition of professionalisation, which includes the 
type of training received and the materiel accessible, this would also influence the capacity to 
repress popular mobilisation. Bellin, however, connects accessibility to materiel with the factors of 
international support networks (in this case meaning foreign supplies of arms materiel, and fiscal 
health, which gives the ability to purchase this).114 However, one must look at the strategic choices 
of the regime for its coercive apparatus to see how these means have been distributed. Even though 
the Tunisian regime did not lack for funds or materiel, the units most likely to protect the regime 
until the very end may not have been well-equipped enough, large enough or trained for crowd-
control in a way that would have allowed them to counter the mass of people taking to the streets in 
2011.115 
 
3.5.1 The Military 
 
The Tunisian armed forces are widely considered to be one of the most professional and 
institutionalised in the Middle East.116 While Tunisian security and intelligence officials were 
generally trained in France, the Tunisian military has one of the highest ratios of US-trained officers 
in the Middle East, where they have a good reputation.117 It was kept poorly funded relative to the 
Interior Ministry and other Middle Eastern militaries, and so had been left with using ageing 
equipment.118 Though the armed forces played an important role in the fight for independence, 
which contributed to making it a symbol of the state, it was largely excluded from political 
participation, especially by the Ben Ali regime. Thus, it had no vested political interests in the 
regime, nor any economic ones, as is the case with for example the Egyptian regime, which has vast 
economic interests and advantages that were protected by the regime.119 
The purpose of the military has in Tunisia been connected to the protection of the state, mostly 
concerning border control and foreign threats. Though the military was deployed for domestic 
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purposes in 1978-84, most prominently in the food riots in 1984, there was reportedly resentment 
for this among its officers corps and it had been eager to return to the barracks. The notion of firing 
at large crowds of unarmed protesters thus seriously challenged the institutional integrity of the 
military.120 
The extent to which the military had a sense of corporate identity and coherence within its ranks is 
also demonstrated by the fact that officers and soldiers still considered Rachid Ammar their Chief 
of Staff even after he was dismissed by Ben Ali for refusing to order soldiers to shoot at protesters. 
The sense of institutional integrity within the military elite is also demonstrated by the fact that it 
willingly stepped back and left the path clear for a new civilian government after Ben Ali had been 
ousted, again in contrast to its Egyptian counterpart.121 In fact, as researcher Philippe Droz-Vincent 
notes, the military was basically the only Tunisian institutional actor to remain coherent and intact 
in the face of the massive popular mobilisation.122 
 
3.5.2 The Interior Ministry 
 
Though there were, as previously mentioned, many units and institutions under the command of the 
Interior Ministry, some estimates may be made in regards to the level of institutionalisation within 
its ranks, based on the actions of certain units during the uprising, as well as its top officials. There 
is also a much lower availability of reliable information on the structure of the Interior Ministry, 
where even estimates of the number of people employed within it range between 80,000 and some 
130,000 security officials123 It is evident that the Interior Ministry was much more entangled with 
the regime than the military. While military officers were excluded from political participation, the 
top intelligence and security officials were very much part of the political elite of the country.124 
The political bureau of the RCD in 2010 held both the current and the former Minister of Interior, 
Rafik Belhaj Kacem and Adbdallah Kallel, demonstrating the prevalence of security officials in the 
corridors of power.125 However, it is important to remember that the agencies of the Interior 
Ministry did not act as a single corps, but is rather a web of security agencies and units, with 
different objectives and purposes. The paramilitary capacity lies mainly in the 12,000-strong 
National Guard, 126 which took its orders directly from the Interior Ministry, and the 5,000-me n 
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strong Presidential Guard, commanded Chief of Presidential Security Ali Seriati. This unit may be 
considered professional and well funded in the sense that it is well trained and well equipped, but 
little is known about its internal structure, making it hard to assess the level of institutionalisation. 
However, the fact that Seriati inflated the number of protesters in his reports to Ben Ali in order to 
get clearance for harsher security measures strongly indicates he was acting in self-interest rather 
than within an institutional framework. This is enhanced by reports indicating Ali Seriati was in fact 
in charge of the entire crackdown on protesters, despite his formal position being Chief of 
Presidential Security, rather than Minister of Interior.127 This is very indicative of the unclear 
power-structures of a an un-institutional structure.128 
It is Ali Seriati’s Presidential Guard that is believed to have been responsible for the bulk of deadly 
firing at protesters, mainly through snipers. Along with the anti-riot squad of the police, the BOP,  
these units showed willingness to brutally repress protesters, but simply did not have the manpower 
in the face of popular mobilisation.129 Regular police forces attacked and even fired on protesters in 
the early stages of the uprising, but were not trained nor equipped for dealing with large crowds of 
unarmed protesters. In Kasserine, local police did little to disperse protesters, but waited for the 
reinforcement of the BOP and National Guard.130 While the chaotic nature of events during the 
uprising makes it difficult to distinguish between the roles played by different sections of the police 
during the uprising, the fact that thousands of police officers took to the streets in a march of 
reconciliation with the revolution, chanting ”we are innocent of the blood of the martyrs” and 
demanding higher wages and the right to form a union, suggests that not all police were hard core 
supporters of the regime, nor saw themselves as having been deployed for the legitimate purpose of 
the police institution.131 
 
3.6 Level of Popular Mobilisation 
 
There are several possible and useful approaches for analysing the popular mobilisation that 
occurred during the uprisings. The tendency, however, is to focus on the reasons and triggers that 
were able to bring about as high a level of popular mobilisation as was seen in Tunisia and other 
Arab countries in 2011, as does Bellin in her analysis of the Arab Spring, outlining underlying 
grievances, emotional triggers, impunity and social media as key factors in bringing people to the 
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streets.132 For the purpose of this assignment, however, focus must lie on the effect the popular 
mobilisation had on the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus to repress it, regardless of what 
caused people to take to the streets. Along with the level of popular mobilisation, we must also look 
at the demographic composition of demonstrators and the nature of the protests. 
There are some issues with using popular mobilisation as a factor, however. As Bellin points out, it 
brings a certain circularity into the argument, as the level of popular mobilisation is in many ways 
affected by the states coercive will and capacity.133 However, there is no clear relation established 
between coercion and dissent, though many researchers have tried to solve this puzzle.134 Turning 
the argument over, one could say that it is the factor that needs to be considered the most. Both the 
fiscal health, international support networks and level of institutionalisation of the Tunisian regime 
had not seen dramatic changes in the weeks before the uprising, but it was not until people took to 
the streets that the regime starting cracking and collapsed. However, neither should it be over-
emphasised as, just as the theoretic framework of this essay suggests, it is not sufficient on its own 
to bring about regime change. 
 
The first thing that stands out about the protests in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and start of 2011 is 
the high level of popular mobilisation, but not only at a single location but all over the country. This 
is significant because nationwide spread of protest greatly reduces the capacity of the coercive 
apparatus to repress, as it is forced to ”spread thin” in to contain protests in all critical locations. 
The mere geographical spread of protests has been overlooked in most analyses of the protests, but 
is important since it may impact the capacity of the coercive apparatus to repress protests in all 
places, as it needs to prioritise between hotspots. Nationwide spread also raises the cost of 
repression, as firing at protesters in one place might cause outrage and increased demonstrations in 
other cities.135 This is what happened in Kasserine and Thala, where riot police and national guards 
had to be brought in from other cities to quell protests, but the killing of protesters caused national 
outrage and was quickly followed by large demonstrations in other cities, including Tunis.136 
 
Another important factor of these events, as Bellin also points out, is the heterogenous composition 
of protesters. Though many of the protesters where young, people of all ages took to the streets, and 
they did not represent a certain ideology, political group, class or worker’s union.137 This bolstered 
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the legitimacy of the demonstrations, as they appeared to be representative of the people - and thus 
made police and soldiers more hesitant to fire at a group perceived as an ”us” rather than a 
”them”.138 Had the protests, for example, had an Islamic appeal, the military might have felt it 
within its institutional framework to protect the secular character of the Tunisian state. The 
demographics of the country may play in, too. Tunisian population is largely homogenous in its 
Arab Sunni Muslim composition, and so police, security and military personnel came from the 
same ethnic and religious background as the protesters.139 
 
Thirdly, the methods of the protesters is likely to have affected the will of the military elite to fire at 
protesters. The demonstrations were largely peaceful, and thus did not threaten the national security 
of the state, a strong institutional imperative for any state’s armed forces. Furthermore, ordering 
soldiers to fire at unarmed and peaceful protesters might increase the risk of defection.140 In the 
Tunisian case, when the military leadership was ordered to shoot, it chose to defect in its entirety, 
not leaving the dilemma to the individual soldiers.141 
 
In the end, however, there is no denying that the sheer mass of people taking to the street,  
especially towards the last days before the president departure, had a very big impact on its own. 
Police and security forces were not able to hold together in the face of tens of thousands of people 
marching down the Habib Bourguiba Boulevard, and subsequently the political system, having 
remained roughly the same since independence, crashed.142 
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4 Conclusion 
 
The uprisings of 2011 were not the first incident of spontaneous protests in Tunisia. Similar scenes 
played out in 1978, 1984 and 2008. However, in all previous cases, demonstrators were repressed 
by the coercive apparatus - and in both 1978 and 1984 the army had taken part in crushing the 
unrest, albeit grudgingly. In 2011, the army refused Ben Ali’s orders to fire at protesters, while 
police and security services where overwhelmed by the the number of people on the streets. Four 
factors were outlined to affect the will and capacity of the coercive apparatus: Fiscal health, 
international support networks, the level of institutionalisation and the level of popular 
mobilisation. 
 
Though the Tunisian regime did not face a fiscal crisis, the financial policies in regards to  the 
military may have affected the will of officers to stand by the regime. The Tunisian military was 
poorly funded relative to the Interior Ministry, and the officer corps was disenfranchised from the 
regime, thus holding no economic interests in its survival. While top officials of the Interior 
Ministry, and the paramilitary forces under their command were willing to stand by Ben Ali in the 
face of popular mobilisation, regular police were hesitant to fire at large crowds of protesters and 
preferred to wait for the reinforcements of the BOP and Presidential Guard, as was seen in Thala 
and Kasserine on 8-10 January. The protest march organised by police after the uprising, distancing 
themselves from repression of protesters and demanding higher salaries and the right to form a 
union, suggests significant discontentment. While this is not on its own conclusive evidence of the 
motivations and actions of police during the uprising, a discontentment with their financial status 
way have affected the extent to which they were ready to engage in repression of large crowds of 
people during the uprising. 
 
Tunisia had long been an ally of Western International actors in the region, upheld as a model of 
political stability while playing on the Wests fear of Islamism in order to maintain support for its 
repressive policies. Western backing continued all the way to the start of the protests, and both the 
US and the EU remained largely silent during the demonstrations. France even offered the support 
of its security expertise, though the move was stopped in the face of public outrage in France. 
 The WikiLeaks cables released in December 2010, which detailed the corruption of the Ben 
Ali regime and that of his wife’s family, the Trabelsis, may have served to delegitimise the regime 
and shame it internationally in advance of the outbreak of protest. This in turn likely increased 
people’s willingness to take to the streets, but also eroded the willingness of top military officials, 
known to be contemptuous of the rampant corruption of the ruling family, to stand by its regime. 
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Though we cannot confirm what happened behind the scenes in the last days of the uprisings, there 
are also reports that the US administration informed Ben Ali that it was time to go the day before he 
left for Saudi Arabia. The 2011 uprising also received a larger amount of international attention 
from media coverage of international networks, notably Al-Jazeera, which heavily covered the story 
already at an early stage in the demonstrations. 
 
The level of institutionalisation of the Tunisian coercive apparatus differed greatly between the 
military and the Interior Ministry. The military was an important symbol of the state, and  was 
mostly charged with national defence and was very rarely deployed for domestic purposes. The US-
trained officers corps enjoyed a good international reputation and was known to be contemptuous of 
the corruption within the ruling family. Thusly, it had very little invested in the regime and its top 
officials would very likely even benefit from a regime change. It was also the only institutional 
actor to remain coherent throughout the uprising, and soldiers followed the command of their Chief 
of Staff Rachid Ammar even after he was dismissed by Ben Ali for refusing to order them to shoot 
at protesters. 
 The Interior Ministry, on the other hand, displayed all the signs indicative of a un-
institutional structure. It was highly entangled with the regime, several of the ruling party’s top 
officials coming from an Interior Ministry background, including Ben Ali himself. The command 
structures were also unclear, having several overlapping security and intelligence units with unclear 
objectives. Chief of Presidential Security Ali Seriati was seemingly in charge of the entire security 
crackdown on protesters during the uprising and intentionally exaggerated his reports to Ben Ali to 
get clearance for harsher measures. 
The pattern identified largely coincides with Bellin’s predictions, the institutionalised actors 
defected from the regime while the un-institutionally structured institutions stood by it longer.  
 
The final factor, the level of popular mobilisation, was notably higher in the 2011 Uprising than in 
previous incidents in Tunisian history. Though Tunisia has seen high levels of popular mobilisation 
before, in particular in 1984, they did not quite compare to the extent of protests in 2011. An 
important factors is the fast spread of protests, which meant security forces equipped to deal with 
crowds had to be concentrated to hotspots, such as Thala, Kasserine and Tunis, while outrage over 
violence made demonstrations spread even faster. Such high levels of popular mobilisation that was 
seen in the 2011 Uprising undermined the legitimacy of the regime, especially since the protesters 
did not represent any particular political, ethnic or religious group. A broader demographic 
representation both increases the perceived legitimacy of protests and makes soldiers and police 
more likely to defect or refuse to shoot, since it increases their sense of identification with the 
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protest. Tunisia’s largely homogenous demographic composition also meant protesters and 
personnel of the coercive apparatus largely cam from the same ethnic and religious background. 
That type of reasoning is very likely to have influenced Chief of Staff Rachid Ammar’s decision not 
to order his soldiers to fire, thus ensuring the entire military defecting from the regime, rather than 
leaving the decision to individual soldiers. 
 
The above analyses shows that while the paramilitary forces under the command of the Interior 
Ministry and Ali Seriati proved willing to repress the uprising, they did not possess the capacity to 
do so, with an estimated paramilitary capacity of 15,000 men at its disposal when protests flared all 
across the country. This is interesting since even though the Interior Ministry was well-funded and 
well-staffed, estimates ranging between 80,000 and 120,000 personnel, the bulk of this was in 
police and intelligence, rather than paramilitary forces equipped to deal with large crowds. The lack 
of information of which units were involved in what during the uprising, to what extent ordinary 
police participated in violent repression, and to what point, hampers the investigation. However, the 
protest march carried out by police in the month after Ben Ali’s departure suggests that not all parts 
of its ranks had been willing to fire at neighbours and family members taking to the streets, while 
not being conclusive evidence on its own. Further research on the role of the local police forces in 
the uprising would be of interest to further examine to impact of the will of individual members of 
the coercive apparatus to engage in repression in the face of mass protest. 
 While the military had the capacity to repress protests, it chose not to. It had a high sense of 
institutional integrity, while being economically and politically disenfranchised from the regime. 
While the Tunisian regime has long held the support of international actors, the circumstances 
before and during the uprising, such as the WikiLeaks cables and the extensive  international media 
coverage of the protest movement, had started to erode that seemingly unconditional backing. In the 
face of the mass of peaceful protesters against a corrupt regime, Rachid Ammar’s decision not to 
order his men to shoot seems logical. However, it is important to remain critical of the assessment, 
as the assumptions are based on the actions and events of the uprising, rather than any true 
knowledge of Rachid Ammar’s real motives and intentions. 
In conclusion, the incapacity of the police and paramilitary units of the Interior Ministry to repress 
the high level of popular mobilisation seen during the 2011 uprising, along with the decision of the 
military not to repress, had a crucial impact on the outcome of the uprising, which lead to Ben Ali’s 
removal from office and the introduction of a democratic process. Thus we can see that the will and 
capacity of different parts of the coercive apparatus strongly affected outcome of events, however in 
different ways depending on the nature of the separate institutions.
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